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HOW SHOULD THE ICC PROSECUTOR
EXERCISE HIS OR HER DISCRETION?
THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES
BRIAN D. LEPARD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues to
develop its work, the question of the exercise of discretion by the
ICC Prosecutor, a post currently held by Mr. Luis MorenoOcampo, is assuming great importance. Decisions made now by
the Prosecutor are helping to shape both the jurisprudence of the
Court and its political future.'
In this Article I suggest that "fundamental ethical principles"
should guide the exercise of discretion by the ICC Prosecutor in
determining which situations to investigate and which cases to
prosecute. I define fundamental ethical principles as all of those
ethical principles apparent in contemporary international law that
are logically related to a preeminent ethical principle of "unity in
diversity." 2 The principle of unity in diversity maintains that all
human beings should seek to be unified as members of one human
family while respecting one another's right to diversity of
language, religion, and culture and individual freedom of thought,
conscience, belief, and expression. 3
In the balance of the Article I explore the relevant provisions
of the Rome Statute of the ICC ("Rome Statute"), which
necessarily govern the exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor,

* Law Alumni Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I
am grateful to Dr. Shahram Dana for inviting me to participate in the
symposium where an earlier version of this Article was presented, and to my
co-panelists for the valuable comments they made and questions they raised
concerning the Article. I also appreciate the outstanding research assistance of
Matthew Novak of the Marvin & Virginia Schmid Law Library of the
University of Nebraska College of Law.

1. On

the

ICC,

see

generally

THE

EMERGING

PRACTICE

OF THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
2. For a more detailed definition, see BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 81
(2010) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW].

3. See id. at 78-81 (defining and reviewing support for unity in diversity).
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highlighting certain ambiguities in these provisions. I briefly
review the Prosecutor's recent decisions to date concerning which
situations to investigate and cases to prosecute, various scholarly
critiques of those decisions, and his own efforts to establish
criteria for the exercise of the Prosecutor's discretion. I then
identify certain fundamental ethical principles related to the
Prosecutor's responsibilities and explain why these are
appropriate means to channel the Prosecutor's exercise of
discretion. Finally, I explore particular challenging issues faced by
the Prosecutor and indicate how fundamental ethical principles
can assist the Prosecutor in resolving them.
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ROME STATUTE
First, it is critical to understand the framework established
by the Rome Statute of the ICC itself for exercise of discretion by
the Prosecutor. 4 The Rome Statute gives the Prosecutor wide
discretion over the launching of investigations into situations that
could involve crimes within the Court's jurisdiction as well as in
the bringing of cases against particular suspects. The Prosecutor
enjoys the greatest degree of discretion under Article 15, which
provides that the Prosecutor "may initiate investigations proprio
motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court."5
According to Article 15, the Prosecutor must "analyse the
seriousness of the information received," and in doing so "may seek
additional information from States, organs of the United Nations,
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other
reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive
written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court."6 If the
Prosecutor "concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation," he or she must submit a request for
authorization of an investigation to a Pre-Trial Chamber of the
Court.7 That chamber may then authorize the commencement of
an investigation if it believes there is such a reasonable basis and
8
the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Even when a state party refers a situation to the Prosecutor
4. On the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and its
drafting history, see generally COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).

5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15,

1, July 17,

1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome

Statute] (emphasis in original).
6. Id. art. 15,
2. See also ICC-ASP, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 104, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002) (prescribing the process by
which the Prosecutor evaluates information).
7. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15, 3.
8. Id. T 4.
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under Article 14, or the Security Council does so under Article
13(b), the Prosecutor must determine whether the situation merits
investigation or particular individuals should be charged.9 This
determination also involves significant judgment and discretion.
Article 53 lays down standards to guide the Prosecutor in
deciding whether to initiate an investigation of a situation or the
prosecution of a particular individual. It provides generally:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she
determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this
Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the
Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a) The information

available to the Prosecutor provides a

reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdictionof the
Court has been or is being committed;

(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of

victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.10

Article 17 indicates that a case is not admissible (1) if it is
being investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over
it, "unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution"; (2) if the case has been
investigated by a state with jurisdiction that has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned, "unless the decision resulted from
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute";
or (3) if the person concerned has already been tried for the
relevant conduct, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
Article 20, paragraph 3.11 Importantly, Article 17 also states that a
case is inadmissible if it is "not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court."' 2
Article 17 and the abovementioned provisions of Article 53
thus suggest a number of factors that may warrant a prosecutorial
decision to decline to prosecute. Furthermore, the Prosecutor must
also inform the pre-trial chamber and either the state making a
referral or the Security Council, if it has made a referral, of any
decision that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution and
the reasons for that decision. 13

9.
10.
11.
12.

See generally id. art. 53.
Id. 1 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 17, 1(a), (b), and (c).
Id. I 1(d) (emphasis added).

13. See id. art. 53,
information).

1 2 (requiring the Prosecutor to provide the indicated
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III. SITUATIONS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE
PROSECUTOR

Currently there are four situations that are being
investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor and have resulted in
formal charges: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Darfur in the Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In
November 2009, the Prosecutor sought authorization from a pretrial chamber to open an investigation into the situation in Kenya
relating to post-election violence there in 2007 and 2008. A twojudge majority of Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the authorization
on March 31, 2010.14 One member of the chamber, Judge HansPeter Kaul, dissented on the ground that the alleged acts, while
crimes, did not rise to the level of organized "crimes against
humanity" within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute.15

The states parties of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and the Central African Republic referred the situations in
those countries to the Prosecutor pursuant to Article 14. The
Security Council, in Resolution 1593 dated March 31, 2005,
referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor under Article
13(b).16 Importantly, the situation in Kenya is the first to have

been approved for investigation by a pre-trial chamber pursuant to
the Prosecutor's proprio motu powers under Article 15. It
represents a historical "test case" involving delineation of the
boundaries of the Prosecutor's discretion to launch an
investigation under that article.
IV.

CRITIQUES OF THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY THE ICC
PROSECUTOR AND EFFORTS To DEVELOP GUIDELINES FOR
THE EXERCISE OF HIS OR HER DISCRETION

There is no question, of course, that the ICC Prosecutor,
handicapped by limited resources and confronting a myriad of
situations throughout the globe that may involve crimes within
the Court's jurisdiction, faces challenging dilemmas in selecting
situations and cases. And the work of the Court is still in its
embryonic stages. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have
critiqued the exercise of discretion by the current ICC Prosecutor.
Some scholars, such as William Schabas, have argued that the
Prosecutor has allowed states parties and the Security Council to

14. ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision Pursuant to Article 15
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya, 83, ICC-01/09 (Mar. 31, 2010).
15. See id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, at 78, T 150
(finding that there was not an "organization" that established a policy to
attack the civilian population, as required under Article 7(2)(a)).
16. S.C. Res. 1593, T 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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control the selection of situations and cases meriting prosecution,
rather than forcefully exercising his proprio motu powers to bring
grave cases before the Court.17 They have, moreover, criticized him
for declining to investigate allegations of crimes that arguably are
more serious than other crimes that he has investigated.18 Judge
Kaul, in his dissent to Pre-Trial Chamber II's authorization of an
inquiry into the situation in Kenya, implicitly faulted the
Prosecutor for overstepping the bounds of his authority under the
Rome Statute by seeking to investigate crimes that more closely
resembled ordinary crimes than crimes against humanity. 19
More broadly, many critics have observed that all of the
situations under investigation to date have occurred on the
continent of Africa. This lends support to suspicions that the
Prosecutor is biased against developing countries and in favor of
Western countries-that the ICC is, in the words of Professor
Schabas' Article written for this symposium, a twenty-first century
agent of "victor's justice." 20 Commentators have also expressed
concern, notwithstanding the filing of charges against President
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir of the Sudan, that the ICC
Prosecutor has tended to bring charges against leaders of rebel
groups. 21 Such critiques have been accompanied by calls for the
Prosecutor clearly to indicate what factors he will rely upon in
exercising his discretion-what one scholar has called "ex ante"
criteria for the exercise of "structured discretion." 22
Toward this end, the Office of the Prosecutor has published
regulations, which entered into force in April 2009, laying down
the factors that the Prosecutor will consider in deciding whether to
launch a proprio motu investigation under Article 15 or to
prosecute particular cases under Article 53. For example,

17. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial
Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 731, 74953 (2008) [hereinafter ProsecutorialDiscretion] (critiquing the practice of "selfreferral" by states).
18. See, e.g., id. at 747-48 (arguing that the Prosecutor should give greater
weight to the objective gravity of a crime as opposed simply to the number of
victims).
19. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 15, at 3-4, IT
4-6; id. at 5, T 10.
20. See generally William A. Schabas' article in this symposium issue,
Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations"at the InternationalCriminal Court, 43
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (2010) [hereinafter Victor's Justice] (arguing that the
ICC risks being viewed as an agent of "victor's justice" through the
Prosecutor's politicized but nontransparent selection of situations and cases).
21. See Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 17, at 749-53
(criticizing the Prosecutor's record of directing his attention to rebel groups
rather than state authorities).
22. Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor'sDiscretion Not to Proceed in the
"Interests of Justice", 50 CRIM L.Q. 305, 324-25 (2005) [hereinafter The ICC
Prosecutor'sDiscretion].
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Regulation 29 states:
In acting under article 15, paragraph 3, or article 53, paragraph 1,
the Office shall produce an internal report analysing the seriousness
of the information and considering the factors set out in article 53,
paragraph 1 (a) to (c), namely issues of jurisdiction, admissibility
(including gravity), as well as the interests of justice, pursuant to

rules 48 and 104. The report shall be accompanied by a
recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate
an investigation. 23
The same regulation affirms that "in order to assess the
gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation the
Office shall consider various factors including their scale, nature,
manner of commission, and impact."24 Based on the abovementioned report, the Prosecutor "shall determine whether there
25
is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation."
The Prosecutor has also issued a policy paper on the meaning
of the "interests of justice." In that paper the Prosecutor takes the
position, among others, that "there is a difference between the
concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and
that the latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than
the Office of the Prosecutor."26 These regulations and guidelines
represent important progress in delineating the most important
factors that should guide the Prosecutor's exercise of discretion.
At the same time, they could be informed by a more
comprehensive policy concerning how the Prosecutor should select
situations for investigation and cases for prosecution. Moreover,
there are grounds to raise more searching questions about the
criteria that the Prosecutor has proposed.
V. THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
I suggest that it is both appropriate and essential to turn to
fundamental ethical principles as the basis for such a
comprehensive policy. As I have explored in my writings, a
number of ethical principles today find expression in international
law and are logically related to a foundational principle of unity in
diversity. Among those fundamental ethical principles relevant to
the exercise of the Prosecutor's functions are:
*

the equal dignity of all human beings;

*

universal human rights and universal human duties to
respect human rights;

23. ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Reg. 29, T 1, ICC-

BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009) (emphasis added).
24 Id. 2 (emphasis added).
25. Id. 1 3.
26. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paperon the Interests of Justice, 1 (Sept.
2007).
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*

a trust theory of government and limited state sovereignty;

*

the right to life, to physical security, and to subsistence;

*

the right to freedom of moral choice, including freedom of
thought, conscience, religion, opinion, and expression;

*

open-minded consultation;

*

individual moral responsibility for criminal behavior;

*
*

the reformative, deterrent, and protective purposes of
punishment of criminal behavior, without vengeance;
respect for governments and law;

*

the interdependence between peace and human rights;

*

the fostering of peaceful methods of dispute resolution;

*

the observance of humanitarian rules in military action;
and

*

a definition of "impartiality" as adherence to fundamental
ethical principles. 27

559

To give one example of evidence supporting these principles
in international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
announces in Article 1 that "all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood." 28 This statement affirms a preeminent ethical
principle of the unity of the human family, while also declaring
that human beings are morally equal and entitled to equal rights
on the basis of their common membership in that single family.
It is appropriate to use these principles as a "background"
ethical value system that can inform the ascertainment and
interpretation of international law-and the exercise of discretion
by actors such as the U.N. Security Council or the ICC Prosecutor
established by broad, multilateral treaties like the UN Charter or
the Rome Statute-for a number of reasons. Most importantly,
states themselves have endorsed these ethical principles through
these treaties. These principles have not been plucked from "thin
air," or derived from philosophical theories with no connection to
international law. On the contrary, they are immanent in
contemporary international law and the vast majority of states in
27. See BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A
FRESH LEGAL APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD RELIGIONS 39-98 (2002) [hereinafter
RETHINKING
HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION]
(elaborating on these

CUSTOMARY
ethical
principles).
See also LEPARD,
fundamental
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 77-94 (similarly describing various

fundamental ethical principles).
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 1 [hereinafter Universal
Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.
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the global community of states have given rhetorical assent to
them. 29
Indeed, the Rome Statute itself articulates and reflects many
of these principles. For example, it acknowledges the preeminent
principle of unity in diversity by asserting, in the very first
preambular paragraph, that its parties are "conscious that all
peoples are united by common bonds." 30 The second and third
paragraphs of the preamble declare that "grave crimes" involving
"unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity .

.

. threaten the peace, security and well-being of the

world," thus drawing an important linkage between peace and
human rights.3 1 The Rome Statute furthermore recognizes the
reformative, deterrent, and protective purposes of punishment of
criminal behavior, without vengeance. The fifth preambular
paragraph affirms in this connection the determination of states
parties to "put an end to impunity for the perpetrators" of serious
international crimes "and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes." 32 Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 self-evidently approve of the
observance of humanitarian rules in military action. 33
I have suggested elsewhere that these fundamental ethical
principles can be classified in descending order of importance as
"essential," "compelling," and "fundamental."34 It is likewise
possible to rank human rights as "essential," "compelling," and
"fundamental."35 These terms relate to the relative importance of a
right in relation to the preeminent principle of unity in diversity
and the permissible scope of limitations on the right. For example,
I define "essential" human rights as those that are very closely
related to unity in diversity and should, because of their moral
importance, preempt any possible reasons for not respecting them
in all, or virtually all, cases.3 6 Freedom from genocide, to take one
illustration, is an essential human right because the right to life is
of supreme importance and there can be no grounds for infringing
29. For a more detailed explanation of why these principles deserve to be
the foundation for a new approach to customary international law as well as
treaty law, see LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 9294.
30. Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
31. Id.
32. Id.
1 (providing that the ICC has jurisdiction over
33. See id., art. 5,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, in addition to the crime of
aggression, all of which can occur during the conduct of military action). See
also id., arts. 6-8 (defining the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the ICC).
34. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 81-82. See
also id. at 83, Fig. 5.1 (depicting this classification of ethical principles).
35. Id. at 82-86. See also id. at 85, Fig. 5.2 (depicting this classification of
human rights).
36. Id. at 84.
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upon its exercise.8 7 On the other hand, broader limitations are
permissible in relation to compelling and fundamental rights. 38
The fundamental ethical principle of respect for law initially
underscores the importance of the Prosecutor being faithful to
those standards for the exercise of his or her discretion laid down
in the Rome Statute itself as the governing treaty establishing the
Prosecutor's powers. As we have seen, these standards require an
evaluation of the "gravity" of the crime, the "interests of victims,"
and whether a prosecution would not serve "the interests of
justice." Unfortunately, however, many of these terms are fraught
with ambiguity. For example, what is a "grave" crime? How can
the degree of gravity be assessed? And what does it mean to say
that a prosecution would not serve the interests of "justice," a
notoriously malleable term?
It is appropriate, of course, in interpreting a treaty such as
the Rome Statute, to give deference to established principles of
treaty interpretation, including reference to the travaux
prdparatoireswhere the text is ambiguous, as called for by Article
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 39 In my other
writings I have proposed a method of treaty interpretation that is
based on, but also extends, these traditional rules. This method
involves four steps:
1. Ascertain whether a treaty provision has an ordinary meaning
in light of the objects and purposes of the treaty.
2. Refer to various supplementary means of interpretation
including, but not limited to, the views expressed by states
during the preparation of the treaty (the travaux
prdparatoires) to ascertain the parties' true shared
understandings of their obligations at the time the treaty was
adopted.

3. Consider the possible existence of new generally accepted
understandings of treaty terms that alter either the ordinary
meaning of the treaty text or the parties' original
understandings. These new shared understandings

should

prevail to the extent they are equally or more consistent with
fundamental ethical principles.

4. If there are remaining ambiguities, favor interpretations of the
treaty that best help to implement fundamental
principles. 40

ethical

37. See id. at 138-39, 254, 341.
38. Id. at 84-85.
39. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(1969), art. 31, 1 (stating that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance

with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and "in the light of its
object and purpose"); id. art. 32 (identifying supplementary means of

interpreting a treaty, including recourse to its preparatory work).
40. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 196. See
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This method can be applied to the interpretive problems
raised above concerning relevant terms in Articles 17 and 53 of the
Rome Statute. I am not able in the space available here to apply
this method rigorously to all of these. However, certain
preliminary observations can be made with respect to some of
them, and in particular "gravity" and "the interests of justice."
Article 53 refers to the "gravity" of an offense. The ordinary
meaning of "gravity" in this context is "importance" or
"seriousness." 41 The travaux fail to shed more light on the meaning
of the term. However, Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger in their
expert commentary on the Rome Statute have noted that
"preambular paragraph nine refers to 'the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole,' whilst article
1 confirms that the Court's jurisdiction covers 'the most serious
crimes of international concern"'-thus also implying that the
drafters had in mind a notion of "seriousness." 42
What standard should be used to measure seriousness? Even
considering the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute, of which
a primary one is to ensure that "the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole" do "not go
unpunished," 43 it is not clear exactly what criteria should be
employed. Should the focus be on the nature of the crime itself,
regardless of the extent of harm inflicted on victims? On the
nature of the harm inflicted on victims, such as loss of life,
regardless of the number of victims? On the absolute number of
victims? Or on some combination of these factors? Many other
criteria are also plausible. Because of this ambiguity, it is
appropriate to refer to fundamental ethical principles in the ways
just outlined, both to interpret the concept of "gravity" and to
determine how the Prosecutor should exercise the wide discretion
that the Statute gives him or her to assess gravity.
The term "interests of justice" is pregnant with similar, if not
greater, ambiguities. There is no widely agreed upon "ordinary
meaning" of the term, as longstanding philosophical debates
testify, nor is there any evidence from the travaux of the meaning
assigned to this term by the crafters of the Rome Statute. Again,
Bergsmo and Kruger point out the inherent imprecision of the
phrase and the lack of guidance from the Statute's drafters,

also LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 27, at
113-18 (developing a method for interpreting treaties).
41. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS: AMERICAN EDITION 642

(1996) (defining "gravity" at entry 3a as "importance; seriousness; the quality
of being grave").
42. Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an
Investigation, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, at 1065,

1071, sec. 19.
43. Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
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observing that "the exact content of 'interests of justice' is not
defined."44 They argue only that "the Prosecutor must exercise [his
or her] discretion in a reasonable manner and be able to
substantiate a decision not to proceed." 45 Under the method I have
described, fundamental ethical principles can assist in resolving
some of these challenging interpretational dilemmas. They can
also serve as guides for decision making by the Prosecutor within
the capacious margin of discretion the Statute gives him or her,
even if they do not point to determinate conclusions or alleviate
the need for the Prosecutor to make difficult choices.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
THE PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

In the balance of this Article I will offer some examples of the
implications of fundamental ethical principles for future
investigations or prosecutions undertaken by the Prosecutor. A
careful evaluation in light of these principles of already-initiated
investigations and prosecutions pursued by the current ICC
Prosecutor is also warranted, but I am not able to engage in such a
rigorous review here.
First, the proposed classification of human rights as essential,
compelling, and fundamental may assist the Prosecutor in making
relative evaluations of the gravity of particular crimes infringing
on human rights and in assessing the "interests of justice."
Essential human rights include the right to life and to physical
security, the right to subsistence, the right to freedom of moral
choice, and the right to protection from illegitimate uses of force
that are likely to or do result in death or injury to civilians. 46
While all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are serious,
as emphasized in the Rome Statute's preamble, some more directly
infringe on these and other essential human rights than others.
For example, it seems fair to conclude that the commission of
genocide by killing members of a particular national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group, recognized as a crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 6(a) of the Rome Statute, 47 is
a more direct assault on essential human rights than the indirect
transfer by an Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, which is defined as a war
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 8(2)(b)(viii)
44. Bergsmo & Kruger, Article 53, supra note 42, at 1072, sec. 22.
45. Id.
46. See LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 86, Fig.
5.3 (listing selected essential human rights); id. at 341-42 (also giving
examples of essential human rights). See also LEPARD, RETHINKING
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 27, at 59, Fig. 3 (listing the right to
protection from illegitimate uses of force as an essential human right).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 6, 1 (a).
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of the Rome Statute, if committed as part of a plan or policy. 48
While both crimes are serious, the former is more "grave," within
the meaning of Article 53 of the Rome Statute, when measured by
its impact on the enjoyment of essential human rights.
Second, the ethical principle of open-minded consultation can
inform the Prosecutor's policies and actions. This principle
maintains that truth and justice can best be served through a
process of seeking out information and opinions from diverse
sources without preconceived notions. This principle is implicit in
many international constitutional documents, including the U.N.
Charter, which establishes the General Assembly and Security
Council as forums in which free discussion of global issues can
take place with a view to the reaching of unified decisions
wherever possible. 49
The ethical principle of open-minded consultation highlights
the importance of the Prosecutor not only seeking out information
from victims, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, governments, and other actors,50 but also soliciting
their perspectives on how justice in particular situations or cases
can best be achieved. This does not mean that the Prosecutor
objectively should relinquish his or her independent judgment to
any such group, or that the Prosecutor does not need to take care
to avoid perceptions of becoming a "tool" of groups with particular
agendas. But it does imply that the Prosecutor must, with an open
mind, seek out a wide variety of viewpoints on the desirability of
implementing particular proceedings before making any final
decisions on those proceedings.
The principle of open-minded consultation also indicates that
the Prosecutor has certain ethical obligations to share his or her
own line of reasoning not only with relevant ICC institutions, but
also with the general public. Transparency is an important ethical
value. It furthermore naturally helps to build and sustain political
trust of the Court and enhance its legitimacy. It is important that
48. Id. art. 8, 2(b)(viii).
49. See generally Charter of the United Nations arts. 10, 13, 24, 39, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). For
more comprehensive explorations of the principle of open-minded consultation,
and endorsement of it by states as well as the world's great religious and
philosophical traditions, see LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 2, at 90-91; LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra
note 27, at 68-71. See also Brian D. Lepard, Jurying Humanitarian
Intervention and the Ethical Principle of Open-Minded Consultation, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOs XLVII 217 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S.
Williams eds., 2006) (elaborating on the principle of open-minded consultation
and applying it to decision-making concerning humanitarian intervention).
2 (stating that the
50. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15,
Prosecutor may obtain additional information from "states, organs of the
United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or
other reliable sources").
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the Prosecutor carefully justify publicly his or her decisions
concerning why or why not particular situations merit
investigation. He or she may not be able to lay out comprehensive
criteria ex ante, but at least particular decisions ought to be fully
explained. Full and public explanations can furthermore help
temper suspicions about political bias on the part of the
Prosecutor.
Third, fundamental ethical principles highlight the intimate
connection between peace and human rights, a link already
acknowledged, as noted above, in the preamble to the Rome
Statute.51 They recognize that enduring social unity and peace
cannot be achieved without respect for human rights. At the same
time, they indicate that unity and peace among people, groups,
and nations are a prerequisite for the full enjoyment of human
rights. Indeed, war and civil conflict pose some of the greatest
threats to human rights. This mutual interdependence is also
articulated, for example, in the preamble to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which asserts that "recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world." 52
"Justice" is an inherently vague and contentious term, even in
the passage I have just quoted, but one reasonable interpretive
perspective is to consider "justice" the outcome of application of an
ensemble of relevant ethical principles in any particular situation.
To do what is just is to do what is ethical.5 3 Under this conception,
which finds support in international law texts, both peace and
human rights are essential components of "justice." This
understanding lends a richer meaning to the concept of "justice" in
assessing what the "interests of justice" may demand under the
Rome Statute. It may not be warranted for the Prosecutor to
adopt, as he has in his policy paper on the "interests of justice," a
narrow definition of justice that excludes peace.54

51. See id. pmbl. (explaining that States Parties recognize that grave
crimes threaten the peace of the world).
52. Universal Declaration, pmbl.
53. See, e.g., Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy, Introduction, in WHAT
IS JUSTICE? CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 3, 4 (Robert C. Solomon

& Mark C. Murphy eds., 1990) (observing that the question "what is justice?"
is an invitation to answer such broad philosophical inquiries as "What is our
essential relationship to our fellow beings, and what obligations do we have to
one another?").
54. See, e.g., Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of
Justice, supra note 26, at 8 (stating, "The concept of the interests of justice
established in the Statute, while necessarily broader than criminal justice in a
narrow sense, must be interpreted in accordance with the objects and purposes
of the Statute. Hence, it should not be conceived of so broadly as to embrace
all issues related to peace and security.") See id. at 1, 8-9.
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Indeed, a natural way to read the reference to "the interests
of justice" in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, whose meaning is not
clarified by the travaux, is that the drafters had in mind
consideration of a panoply of factors beyond the basic principle
that criminal justice demands that crimes be prosecuted. It is hard
to see how any prosecution could not be in "the interests of justice"
if justice is defined narrowly to include only criminal justice and if
the crime is sufficiently grave otherwise to merit prosecution. As
others have persuasively argued, the Prosecutor must give some
consideration to the impact of a prosecution on reconciliation and
peace-building in a country, which in turn can affect the
enjoyment of human rights.5 5 For example, if a prosecution is
likely to stall settlement efforts and thereby result in many more
future civilian deaths, then "justice" may not be served in this
larger sense, even if it is served by reference to a narrow concept of
criminal justice focusing only on the gravity of the particular past
crime being charged.
Of course, the Prosecutor must also weigh the likelihood that
prosecution will deter future human rights violations56 and must
give significant weight to the ethical principle that crimes morally
must be punished in some fashion and that violators must be held
to account. Indeed, enforcement of criminal responsibility may
legitimately be viewed as a constituent element of long-lasting
peace. The Prosecutor must bear in mind in this regard that the
foundational purpose of the Rome Statute is to prevent impunity.57
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor can also take into account that there
may be indigenous justice or reconciliation mechanisms that
themselves further the ethical principle of preventing impunity,
and allowing these to operate may be in the "interests of justice."5 8
Finally, Article 42 of the Rome Statute requires the
Prosecutor to act "independently" and "impartially."5 9 The terms
"independent" and "impartial" may be subject to varying
interpretations. I propose that from the perspective of
55. See, e.g., Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supranote 17, at 749; Webb,
The ICC Prosecutor'sDiscretion,supra note 22, at 338-40.
56. Some empirical work by political scientists has confirmed such an
effect. See, e.g., Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence
Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, 3
(unpublished paper presented on Oct. 21, 2009, at the "Hauser Globalization
Colloquium Fall 2009: Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Law";
manuscript available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/SikkinkKim.HC20090ct21.pdf) (finding that "transitional countries with human
rights prosecutions are less repressive than countries without prosecutions").
57. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
58. On this point, see, e.g., Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion, supra
note 22, at 338-40.
1, 7. See also id. art. 45
59. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 42,
(requiring the Prosecutor to exercise his or her functions "impartially and
conscientiously").
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fundamental ethical principles "impartiality" may best be defined
as adherence to these principles.60 This does not mean "neutrality"
or a tit-for-tat balancing of the number of prosecutions of members
of one group with an equal number of prosecutions of members of a
6
rival group, as Professor Schabas aptly emphasizes in his Article. 1
It does not preclude the possibility that the Prosecutor will
determine, upon searching and thoughtful review of a situation,
that the cases most deserving of prosecution happen to involve
individuals who are members of only one group engaged in
conflict. But it does require the Prosecutor to assess, in a clear and
transparent way, which situations are most deserving of
investigation and which cases most merit prosecution before the
ICC in light of their impact on the realization of fundamental
ethical principles. Indeed, the Prosecutor should endeavor to
explain his or her decisions by reference to ethics, and not solely
on the basis of juridical criteria, which, we have seen, the Rome
Statute often leaves vague.
In short, fundamental ethical principles-in turn rooted in a
common recognition today by the international community of the
fundamental unity of the human family-can, and should, be used
by the Prosecutor to make many of the challenging, and often
wrenching, decisions that he or she confronts. The Prosecutor can
thereby help the Court develop an ethically grounded
jurisprudence that will also enhance its credibility and legitimacy.
Most importantly, these principles can assist the Prosecutor and
the Court in providing more effective redress for victims of
"unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity."62

60. For an elaboration of this concept, see LEPARD, RETHINKING
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 27, at 93-95. See also id. at 202219.
61. See Schabas, Victor's Justice, supra note 20, at 551-52.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.

